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To The Hague ...
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, your Excellencies, zeer 
gewaardeerde toehoorders, 
You may wonder why the title of my inaugural lecture starts 
with ‘to The Hague’, something that may seem at first sight 
rather activist. Fear not, or do not be misled - depending on 
the expectations you have from what I will say today-, I am 
and remain a pragmatist and realist -or some would say a 
cynic-, when it comes down to international dispute settlement 
law. I do not have the ambition today to promote the use of 
international dispute settlement in international law. ‘To the 
Hague’ also is not a mercantorial device to promote the Hague 
as a venue of international dispute settlement. The Hague is of 
course the ‘International City of Peace and Justice’ and hosts 
some of the most important dispute settlement mechanisms 
in international law, such as the International Court of Justice, 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunals, yet I do not have the intention to 
focus exclusively on the Hague. So, what these words ‘to The 
Hague’ do represent will become clear throughout the lecture.
In this lecture, my inaugural address, I intend to trace the 
emergence of international dispute settlement as a legal 
discipline. I will first give a very brief overview of the current 
status of international dispute settlement as an academic 
discipline, after which I will turn to the reasons behind the 
historical absence of such attention to international dispute 
settlement. Finally, I will discuss whether and why the lack of 
academic attention has changed.
I do not intend here to engage in the question whether as 
a legal discipline, international dispute settlement is an 
autonomous legal discipline, or whether it is a component of 
the legal discipline of international law a question I do not 
intend to settle here. When I use the phrase ‘international 
dispute settlement as a legal discipline’, this therefore may 
in fact also be understood to mean ‘international dispute 
settlement as part of the international legal discipline’. So far, 
the caveats, which are inherent in any legal speech as we often, 
as lawyers, spend an even amount of time explaining what we 
do not do, than what we do or will do. 
International Dispute Settlement as an Academic Enterprise
The area of international dispute settlement, is relatively 
new in the international legal discipline in terms of it being 
an academic enterprise. In this respect, it is remarkable that 
there are only a handful of chairs that are dedicated to this 
legal field, even if one broadens the search to related terms 
such as ‘international dispute resolution’, or ‘international 
arbitration’ in an international law setting. This may well be 
the consequence also of the fact that international dispute 
settlement is a discipline practiced by general international 
law professors also. However, the situation is quite different 
when one looks at the commercial law or private international 
law fields, where chairs in arbitration or alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) are more widespread. It is also notable, that 
the chair I am currently holding is not ‘international dispute 
settlement’, but rather ‘international dispute settlement law’, 
an addition that was made in a relatively last instance. The 
word ‘law’ is revealing. It ascertains that this chair, and what I 
am and will be doing indeed is about the ‘law’ of international 
dispute settlement, and not some other esoteric discipline that 
would be alien to legal research in that field. 
When one looks at the curricula of international law 
programmes, one also - until recently - found few courses 
entirely dedicated to international dispute settlement. There 
are of course exceptions. In fact, a compulsory course on 
international dispute settlement has been traditionally 
included in Leiden University’s Law School Master of Laws 
programmes since long, and of course in several other 
Universities, but one could find until recently few other 
examples until the increased activity of the International 
Court of Justice and other dispute settlement mechanisms 
over the past decade. Courses on international arbitration 
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in international law were similarly mostly absent from 
international curricula, at least until the recent surge in 
investment arbitrations. In contrast, international arbitration 
in commercial law and private international law has been 
slightly more popular, although the first genuine course on 
international arbitration dates only from 1985 at Queen Mary 
University London.1
These two facts - few chairs in international dispute settlement 
and few independent international dispute settlement courses 
- exemplify the main thrust of my argument today - that 
international dispute settlement has until relatively recently 
not been considered nor given space as a separate field of 
research within the international legal discipline. The reasons 
for this are manifold, but one reason is in my view central: 
international dispute settlement was long considered more 
practice than discipline, a practice that occasionally deserved 
some academic attention, but that was not considered as an 
area of research in its own right within the broader field of 
international law. International dispute settlement was more 
about the law than law in itself. 
Let me know turn to some of the aspects of this assertion. 
The Position of International Dispute Settlement in the 
Study of International Law
The position of international dispute settlement in the study 
-broadly speaking- of international law can be captured by 
three interrelated points: 
First, settling international disputes and devising a 
mechanism to that effect has long been something more 
akin to an aspirational, diplomatic and political endeavour 
than a question of law. Rather than looking into what the 
international law of international dispute settlement is, 
attention was more geared towards how to avoid war and 
whether international dispute settlement mechanisms could 
contribute thereto. So, is international dispute settlement really 
law or rather a political endeavour -or as our former Leiden 
colleague Jean d’Aspremont would say a ‘belief system’?2 
Secondly, if international dispute settlement is law, then a 
second question arises, namely: is there sufficient legal practice 
to study? Until the end of the 1990s, the field was characterized 
by a relatively limited practice - especially when contrasted to 
domestic litigation - with the exception of certain peaks. 
Thirdly, and related to the two previous points, international 
dispute settlement has long been considered more as a practice 
than something part of international law. Dispute settlement 
was more doing law, than thinking about the law.
After an analysis of these three ideas, I will subsequently 
address the overarching question that underlies this address, 
namely: should we see international dispute settlement as a 
legal discipline?
I will offer an answer to this question that will, hopefully, 
convince you. But let me start with the first question.
The Aspirational Nature of International Dispute Settlement 
International dispute settlement has long been perceived 
as something more akin to a diplomatic and political 
endeavour, being aspirational in character. Those involved 
were characterized by dichotomy between the ‘believers’ and 
‘non-believers’ in a form of compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism for States. The aspirational nature of international 
dispute settlement is visible from the excessive focus in the 
history of international dispute settlement, both in politics and 
scholarship, on the exclusive question whether there is a need 
or not for a compulsory method to settle disputes. The believers 
considered that there is such a need, inspired by a sense of 
justice for those States whose rights have been breached, 
by the idea that dispute settlement is necessary to avoid 
recourse to war3, or by the less philanthropic idea that dispute 
settlement, or more broadly enforcement, is necessary in order 
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for international law to be considered law.4 So, the question 
whether international dispute settlement is law, is intimately 
related to the broader discussion whether international law 
truly is law and the focus on enforcement as a requirement for 
such qualification.
I will shortly discuss the rise of dispute settlement mechanisms 
and how this shaped the international legal system. I will not 
retrace here the history of international dispute settlement, 
which has been done by others already and which is essentially 
characterized by a cyclical rise and fall of the use of - 
sometimes rudimentary - forms of arbitration.5 Rather, since 
my lecture today is confined to the question of the surge of 
international dispute settlement as a legal discipline, I will start 
with the period when international law itself was ‘born’ as a 
legal discipline, which is commonly considered to have been 
somewhere towards the end of the 19th Century, not the least 
through the creation of the Institut de Droit International in 
the Town Hall of Ghent.6
From the 1870s onwards, proposals for the establishment of 
some system to arbitrate international disputes were becoming 
common, in line with the general favourable attitude towards 
international law and its role in international society.7 This 
fervent trust in international arbitration found confirmation 
in the increased practice of international arbitration, and 
the relative successes of arbitration to settle highly sensitive 
disputes, such as the arbitration of the Alabama claims between 
the United Kingdom and the United States in 1872, and the Fur 
Seal Arbitration between the same parties, concluded in 1892. 
It is also the period in which arbitration was professionalised, 
in the sense that arbitrators were increasingly selected because 
of their qualifications rather than their political status: foreign 
heads of State were replaced by legal scholars, judges or 
diplomats as arbitrators.8 This resulted in a formalisation of 
international arbitration which found its culmination in the 
creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration - the PCA - 
during the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899. 
What is important is that international arbitration - even after 
the creation of the PCA - was seen not only as a means to settle 
disputes - which it still is today and which I will discuss in my 
next two points - but another ambition also was attached to 
it. International arbitration was seen, and still is seen today, as 
the method - par excellence - to avoid recourse to war and as 
the means to achieve respect for international law or ensure 
implementation of international law. This noble goal had been 
vigorously defended during the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace 
Conference, but which by no means was shared by everyone, 
resulting in the ill-named Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
During the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 during which 
the PCA was created, for the first time in history something 
akin to a permanent international arbitral tribunal was 
created. But there was no compulsory submission of disputes 
to the PCA, and the PCA, despite its name, had nothing of a 
permanent tribunal, leading to quite some disillusionment 
amongst those who had strongly militated in favour of a 
mandatory recourse to arbitration to avoid recourse to war. 
As the Dutch jurist Tobias Asser, who had participated in the 
negotiations of the treaty establishing the PCA, explained: 
‘Instead of a permanent court, the Convention of 1899 gave 
but the phantom of a court, an impalpable spectre, or to 
be more precise yet, it gave us a recorder with a list’.9 The 
statement, while a fine example of Dutch straightforwardness, 
has a strong note of disappointment. 
When the second Hague Peace Conference was convened in 
1907, disappointment made way for some renewed enthusiasm 
for the idea of a permanent tribunal with compulsory 
jurisdiction, but again the dichotomy between the political 
preference for a mandatory system of dispute settlement was 
at its apex. The Russian delegate, Mr. de Martens asked all 
delegates to join him in achieving ‘progress’. He explained :
‘there have always been in history epochs when grand ideals 
have dominated and enthralled the souls of men ; sometimes 
it was religion, sometimes a system of philosophy, sometimes a 
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political theory. The most shining example of this kind was the 
crusades. From all countries arose the cry ‘To Jerusalem ! God 
wills it’. Today, the great ideal which dominates our time is that 
of arbitration.’ 
And so, Martens continued
‘Whenever a dispute arises between the nations, even though 
it be not amenable to arbitration, we hear the unanimous cry, 
ever since the year 1899, ‘To The Hague’’.10
This statement, while encouraging, was in fact more wishful 
thinking, and the outcome of the Second Hague Peace 
Conference showed that the Russian delegate had not managed 
to convince his fellow delegates to create a truly compulsory 
court of arbitration. After Dutch directness, and Russian 
optimism, let us turn to some Belgian pragmatism. The 
Belgian delegate, Mr. Beernaert, opposed the creation of a 
compulsory court of arbitration, based not necessarily on a 
self-interested Belgian opposition to the project, but on the 
pragmatic consideration that such a project, if adopted, would 
simply not gather the necessary support of the States and thus 
remained a ‘dream’. Beernaert explained:
‘Never has the national sentiment been at a higher pitch, and 
old nations and old languages that had thought of as having 
passed to oblivion, are again calling for their place in the sun 
- no one of us would renounce his own land, his own and 
cherished fatherland, and no one would certainly consent to 
being governed from afar, and hence ill governed. Therefore, 
in my judgement, we must regard as a fearful Utopia, the 
dream of a world state or of a universal federation, of one sole 
parliament, of one court of justice supreme over all nations.’11 
That ‘higher’ aspirational goal dominated international 
attention and discussion -including in scholarship, to which 
I will come back in a couple of minutes - since the ‘birth’ 
of international law as a legal discipline. The question was 
whether to settle a dispute and the role dispute settlement 
could play in avoiding war, rather than analysing, from a legal 
perspective, how a dispute is to be settled or which procedural 
rules apply.12
These questions continued to gather attention in the 20th 
Century, although the context in which the discussion took 
place was slightly different. After the creation of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice - the PCIJ - in 1920, discussion 
on whether or not an institution with compulsory jurisdiction 
needed to be created, became of less relevance since many 
believers had achieved what they were longing for - a standing 
court worthy of that name. Yet the PCIJ had no compulsory 
jurisdiction, despite proposals to that effect from the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists headed by the Belgian Baron Descamps13, 
but its permanent and especially its standing character was 
considered a major achievement. According to the American 
lawyer James Brown Scott the ‘Hague system’ was relegated to 
a ‘heresy’14, and replaced by the ‘Geneva system’, comprised of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice and its political 
counterpart the League of Nations Nations which had been 
established at the same time. The PCIJ, much as the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, was seen as part of the ‘system of war 
prevention’15, but there is one important difference with 
the discussions in the context of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration: the PCIJ was established in the context of a strong 
belief not only in a form of compulsory settlement of disputes 
to avoid ‘war’, but also in an institutionalisation to bring about 
peace and development, as exemplified by the creation of the 
League of Nations.16 
After the Second World War, the United Nations and its 
principal judicial organ, the International Court of Justice - the 
ICJ - were created. The ICJ, similar to the PCIJ, was considered 
important to provide a system of enforcement against those 
states who would breach the law and to that end high hopes 
again were put in this ambitious endeavor by the negotiators 
of the Statute of the ICJ and the United Nations Charter. It 
is not a coincidence that the obligation to settle disputes in a 
peaceful way is provided in Article 2 para. 3 of the UN Charter, 
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just before the prohibition on the use of force, mentioned in 
Article 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter. The failures of the PCIJ 
and the League of Nations were considered to have been 
addressed with these new institutions, although many features 
of the PCIJ had simply been taken over in the Statute of the 
ICJ. Yet, the hopes that were put in the ICJ - and the UN for 
that matter - in relation to the capacity of both to provide an 
effective alternative to recourse to war were, as Wilhelm Grewe 
puts it ‘illusory from the very beginning’, and the expectations 
of a turn to ‘justice’ raised from the creation of the two military 
tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo ‘could only impress zealots 
and starry-eyed idealists who were blind to or dazzled by the 
realities of world politics’.17 
This brief historical inquiry brings me to my second question, 
namely whether all these developments were sufficient to 
transform international dispute settlement to international 
dispute settlement law, notably through the generation of 
sufficient practice. 
Limited Practice and Limited Institutions
Until recently, the extent of the practice of international 
courts and tribunals and arbitration has remained all in 
all relatively limited, with the exception of certain peaks of 
activity, which were limited in time and also limited to one 
particular institution or method of dispute settlement, thus 
hindering any transformation of that stand-alone practice 
into something broader and more systemic, something worthy 
of the attention of a legal discipline. Dispute settlement 
mechanisms resulting in a binding outcome remained 
confined to two institutions only: the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and its successor the International Court 
of Justice, and international arbitration. 
As far as arbitration is concerned, the Permanent Court 
or Arbitration initially had a quite impressive activity, and 
international arbitration more generally had its ‘Golden Age’ 
in the late 19th an early 20th Century. The first edition of the 
‘Survey of International Arbitrations’ compiled by Alexander 
Stuyt18, who obtained his law degree at Leiden University, 
but then worked as Secretary at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration and became a professor of international law at 
the University of Nijmegen, contains some 330 arbitrations 
conducted between 1794 and 1919, 242 of which took place 
between 1870 and 1919. After the creation of the PCIJ, and 
then the ICJ, the PCA had almost fallen into oblivion after the 
second World War and until the end of the 1990s, with little 
to no international arbitrations conducted under its auspices. 
More generally, interstate arbitrations then were very limited.19
As far as judicial settlement is concerned, one can only say 
that the PCIJ was a relatively successful, yet short-lived 
experiment. Moreover, the Covenant of the League of Nations 
was premised on the idea that there were two types of 
disputes in international law.20 First, those that were ‘suitable 
for arbitration or judicial settlement’, and those that were 
not because of their political nature. It was thus generally 
accepted that international dispute settlement, either through 
arbitration or the PCIJ, was unsuitable to settle disputes 
concerning the ‘vital interests and honour of States’21, and the 
PCIJ’s case-law was thus restricted mostly to legal technical 
issues. Initially, many disputes were settled by the PCIJ, which 
has delivered decisions in 31 contentious cases between States, 
and 27 advisory opinion between 1922 and 1940.22 But its 
activities were in steep decline in the 1930s, the Court was 
unable to sit between 1941 and 1944 - during the Second 
World War - and it ceased work in 1945. The successes the PCIJ 
had achieved in this short period of time were not sufficient 
to create something akin to a dispute settlement system, and 
international scholarly attention to the PCIJ, rapidly faded 
away as the PCIJ’s activities declined.
The International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction knows of 
no distinction between political and legal disputes, and has 
repeatedly refused to dismiss a claim or a request for an 
Advisory Opinion because of the ‘political’ nature of the 
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question. Yet the abandonment of this dichotomy has not 
yielded much activity for the Court. Until the end of the 1970s, 
the ICJ rendered only 39 judgements and 16 advisory opinions, 
which related to disputes and questions which have been 
described as of ‘minor importance’.23
Political settlement dominated judicial settlement.24 This 
‘dispute settlement inactivity’ can be traced back to the 
fact that the sovereignty and sovereign equality of States 
still requires the explicit consent of the States parties to a 
dispute to have this dispute settlement through arbitration 
or international adjudication, and the paralleled rise in the 
post-World War II period, of international legal realism 
emphasising the distinction between confined legal-technical 
disputes and political tensions or conflicts which were not 
capable of being or should not be settled through legal dispute 
settlement mechanisms such as courts and tribunals.25 Despite 
opposition to legal realism and to that specific question from 
several scholars, notably by Hersch Lauterpacht26, legal realism 
found its way to Governments and domestic policies for 
several decades.27
Moreover, there was also a massive distrust of newly 
independent States, and notably African States, not towards 
the idea of international disputes settlement, but to Western 
institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the 
Court’s decisions in the 1966 South West Africa cases.28 In those 
cases - the first brought before it by African States - Ethiopia 
and Liberia were denied locus standi in relation to the subject 
matter of the dispute - which related to the obligations of 
South Africa towards the mandated territory of South West 
Africa - although the Court had earlier concluded that both 
States had locus standi as a matter of jurisdiction.
Therefore, and until recently, the number of disputes settled 
through international arbitration or international courts or 
tribunals had remained all in all relatively limited, with the 
exception of the inter-war period, when the Permanent Court 
of International Justice was active, and the early years of the 
International Court of Justice until roughly the early 1960s.29 
International Dispute Settlement as a Practice
Related to my two previous points, international dispute 
settlement has since long been regarded as a practice, and not 
something worthy of study in an independent legal discipline. 
This view of the field is perhaps the logical consequence of 
my previous points that international dispute settlement and 
specifically international arbitration was considered as a mere 
way to diplomatically settle conflicts between two or more 
States, or between States and private parties at a later stage, a 
means to apply the law or to ensure respect for the law, rather 
than itself law as such. 
This is of course inherent in the fact that we are dealing here 
with the settlement of international disputes. Settling disputes 
is intrinsically practical in nature and is in its purest form 
indeed nothing more than applying the law rather than law in 
itself, and there would therefore be, as a consequence nothing 
more to say about this procedure that what the outcome of 
that exercise was. This perception has however changed and I 
will come back to this in a couple of minutes. 
For long, the translation of the idea that international law 
is about applying to law rather than anything else, can be 
found in the general view that acting as arbitrator is not a 
profession in and of itself - one is asked to settle a dispute as 
a - remunerated - service to society. This idea has existed since 
long and still is firmly embedded in international practice, 
both on the international and the domestic legal levels. As 
posited by Thomas Clay in 2005:
‘Arbitration is not… a profession; it is a mission, a temporary 
function, not a profession. All those who act as arbitrators 
have, in principle, another job, a main occupation that 
provides them with a steady income and a social status. 
Arbitration is their side activity.’30
This statement was made in the context of commercial 
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arbitration - and one can ask the question whether it is 
still valid today - but it is inherent in the arbitral function. 
Parties to the dispute select they consider to be best placed to 
decide their case.31 As Philippe Fouchard explained in 1965, 
arbitration is 
‘[an] apparently rudimentary method of settling disputes, since 
it consists of submitting them to ordinary individuals whose 
only qualification is that of being chosen by the parties.’32
And because the very idea in domestic legal systems to have 
recourse to arbitration is precisely to avoid recourse to courts 
and tribunals, it is characteristic of the arbitral function that it 
is proposed to individuals who precisely are not ‘professional’ 
adjudicators - such as judges. In fact, a recent survey shows 
that having held a position as a high-ranking civil servant, such 
as a judge, is a characteristic considered of least importance in 
the selection of arbitrators.33
In international law, the same is without doubt also - and 
perhaps even more - true. Because of the predominance of 
the use arbitration to settle international law disputes, the vast 
majority of international disputes were settled by individuals 
who did this alongside any other function they had - they 
were temporarily called upon to exercise an arbitral function 
as a service to the international society of States. Especially at 
a time when international courts and tribunals did not exist, 
this was inevitable. But even thereafter, this practice persisted, 
probably for the same reason that arbitrators in commercial 
disputes are not professional adjudicators. Moreover, in line 
with the historical focus on the diplomatic and political nature 
of international dispute settlement, arbitrators in international 
law were typically indeed not practising attorneys, but rather, 
foreign sovereigns, heads of State, minsters, legal advisors and 
law professors.34
That perspective of the arbitral function, in international 
law, as a service to society is of course characteristic of the 
(international) legal system. My main point here however 
is that, until recently, this has resulted in a perception of 
international dispute settlement, and especially arbitration, as 
a field of practice in essence.
Let me turn now to the impact of these elements on academic 
attention and scholarship in international dispute settlement. 
Academic Attention to International Dispute Settlement 
The three elements I just described - the aspirational nature of 
dispute settlement, the limited practice of courts and tribunals 
and the view of international dispute settlement as a practice, 
have had an important impact on scholarship on the subject. 
First, the basically non-legal academic debate between the 
‘believers’ and ‘non-believers’ has obstructed the move towards 
treating international dispute settlement as a question that 
relates to law rather than political preference, and as explained 
already, much of the original attention devoted to arbitration 
and dispute settlement orbited around the specific question 
of the desirability of compulsory dispute settlement.35 This is 
most visible through various publications on international 
arbitration which appeared during the so-called ‘Peace 
Movement’ between the 1870s and the early nineteenth 
Century36, because that was the main question diplomats and 
negotiators were in fact discussing.
Secondly, and until recently, international dispute settlement 
suffered from a lack of institutionalisation - which I take 
here in its broadest sense as referring to the establishment 
and recognition of the concept of dispute settlement within 
the international society. Until recently indeed the limited 
practice of courts and tribunals, has always been the produce 
of a single institutional setting - the PCA, the PCIJ, and then 
the ICJ - with occasional surges in arbitration. There was thus 
a form of institutionalisation, which of course attracted the 
necessary attention and comments, but this institutionalisation 
was limited mainly to that single mechanisms to settle 
disputes - international dispute settlement as such was not 
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institutionalised or considered to be more than the limited 
practice the PCIJ, the ICJ or of inter-State arbitral tribunals 
produced. And institutionalisation is important since, amongst 
others, it implies the transformation of a certain practice 
from something merely practical or aspirational into a legal 
scientific concern. Ad hocism is not a catalyst for recognition 
as a legal discipline - it is only when certain institutions are 
created that an area of practice becomes of interest to the legal 
academic community. International criminal law provides a 
good example in that respect also - it is really only when the 
two ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former 
Yugoslavia were created that international criminal became 
accepted as a legal discipline. 
Thirdly, up to the increase in disputes settled through 
arbitration and international courts and tribunals, and the 
creation of new avenues to that effect, the limited practice 
in international law has had as main consequence that the 
relevance of international arbitration and international 
adjudication for international law simply was limited. But, as 
disputes were submitted to the existing mechanisms, alongside 
the question whether a compulsory system of dispute 
settlement should be created, academic attention increased and 
moved from that question into three other aspects, which are 
strictly speaking not related to the law of international dispute 
settlement. These aspects very much accord to the idea of the 
field being practice-oriented. 
A first aspect is the output of dispute settlement processes. The 
main works dealing with international courts and tribunals, 
historically, were focusing on how courts and tribunals apply 
the law and whether and how decisions rendered by these 
courts and tribunals have contributed to the development or 
clarification of the law. Examples are Hersch Lauterpacht’s 
‘The Role of Law in the International Community’ of 193337, 
Georg Schwarzenberger’s ‘International Law as applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals’ originally published in 
194538, and Bin Cheng’s ‘General Principles of Law as Applied 
by International Courts and Tribunals’ published in 1953.39 
In the field of arbitration, research was even more limited not 
the least because many of the arbitral awards rendered escaped 
public scrutiny and thus scholarly attention. 
A second aspect relates to the fact that even if such procedures 
were in and of themselves interesting from a legal scientific 
perspective, the idea that dispute settlement merely is about 
applying the law resulted in the fact that most attention was 
paid to compiling the practice rather that analysing it. The 
survey conducted by Alexander Stuyt in 1938, and which was 
updated in 1989, which I mentioned above is significant in that 
respect. Also, the writings on arbitration were often confined 
to the sphere of mixed arbitrations between States and foreign 
companies and commercial arbitration, and were focusing 
also more on the outcome of arbitration or compiling that 
practice - not the least also because of the general distrust of 
practitioners towards non-practising academics.40
A third aspect, is the focus on certain practicalities or 
institution-oriented questions relating to dispute settlement 
and arbitration, or on how a specific court or tribunal 
functioned.41 Also, because of the practice-oriented approach 
to the field, academic attention and publications in the field 
of international dispute settlement and most notably in 
international arbitration, was mostly the work of practitioners 
and academics/practitioners who in most cases limited their 
research and writings to practical problems in the arbitration 
they were facing in their practice.42 Little attention was directed 
to the proper law of arbitration or to theories and concepts in 
that law.
To sum up, international dispute settlement as such thus was 
not really touched upon until the 1990s43. Little publications 
on dispute settlement specifically can be found between 1950 
and 1990. Writing in 1986, Richard Bilder wrote 
‘Unfortunately, we do now know as much as we would like to 
know about disputes and dispute settlement, either within or 
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among nations. While sophisticated empirical and theoretical 
research is beginning to be done concerning dispute processing 
within domestic societies, our study of international disputes 
and the way they are dealt with is less developed, and our 
knowledge is still to a considerable extent intuitive and 
anecdotal’.44
A search on the Peace Palace Library catalogue shows that it 
is indeed only in the 1980s that the notion of ‘international 
dispute settlement’ made its appearance in the titles of articles 
and books. The handbook ‘International Dispute Settlement’ 
by John Merrills, the first edition of which appeared in 
1984, was unique at that point in time. But Merrills, while 
still being today one of the only handbooks on the subject, 
takes an approach to dispute settlement - at least in the first 
versions of his book- which is reminiscent of the perception of 
dispute settlement as a practice, and which consists chiefly of 
discussing the various methods of dispute settlement available 
to States in international law.
 
This is not to say that international dispute settlement 
remained completely unnoticed in scholarship. In addition 
to the exceptions mentioned above, the vast majority of 
international law handbooks or textbooks in that period did 
pay attention to the ways in which international disputes are 
settled. Charles Rousseau for instance, spent more than 50 
out of the 400 pages of his ‘Droit International Public’ of 1979 
to international dispute settlement, covering international 
arbitration, political settlement, judicial settlement and other 
diplomatic methods of settlement such as conciliation.45 These 
and other works that were published, were in view of the 
limited institutions, geared towards compiling the practice of a 
specific institution, such as the International Court of Justice, 
and to explaining the working procedures of the specific 
institutions. Thus, here again, the analysis was more than 
often confined to the output of dispute settlement, rather than 
dispute settlement as such.
This brings me to my next question: why has it changed? Is 
-and why is- international dispute settlement now a legal 
discipline on its own? 
Has it Changed, and Why has it Changed? 
The first question you will ask yourself, of course, is whether 
from a legal scientific perspective there is indeed more to 
say about international dispute settlement than what I just 
explained. Of course there is ; I would otherwise not be 
standing here today. But what I will say next should not be 
read as an apology aimed a justifying my position or what I - 
and other colleagues throughout the world - have been doing 
since more than a decade. International dispute settlement has 
become a legal discipline, as I will explain, and an appropriate 
piece of evidence to convince you upfront is that our new LLM 
Advanced Programme in International Dispute Settlement has 
just been accredited and will start as of September this year. 
It is beyond doubt indeed that academic research on 
international dispute settlement has increased rapidly over 
the past two decades. First, from a research perspective, 
attention has shifted from looking only to the output of dispute 
settlement or a specific institution, to also examine the law of 
international dispute settlement with even specific law journals 
dedicated to the field, such as the Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement. And, secondly, the curricula of law schools 
show an increased training in the fields of dispute settlement, 
evidenced not only by the introduction of various courses on 
the subject but also by the introduction of dispute settlement-
focused master programmes in Geneva, and, as said, as of 
September also here in Leiden. 
But why has this occurred? What has changed compared to the 
three perspectives on dispute settlement discussed earlier? 
An Increase in the Practice of International Dispute Settlement 
The first and most obvious reason relates to the fact that, 
as said earlier, international arbitration and international 
courts and tribunals cannot nowadays - quantitatively - be 
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marginalised in view of the large number of disputes settled 
through such means. The International Court of Justice has 
(almost) never been as active is it now is, although some critics 
have pointed out that, in view of the increase in the number of 
United Nations Members States from 1945 until today - from 
55 to some 194 - there is proportionally not really an increase 
in the Court’s activity compared to the early years.46 The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has since it heard 
its first case in 1997 decided some 25 disputes, the World Trade 
Organisation Dispute Settlement System has decided over 500 
disputes since 1995; and the total number of arbitrations in 
which the PCA acted as a registry amounted to 148 in 2016, 
of which 40 were initiated in that year.47 Of the total number 
of PCA administered cases in 2016, 86 were investor-state 
arbitrations arising under bilateral or multilateral investment 
treaties and national investment laws, and 7 were interstate 
arbitrations. The International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the most used forum for the 
settlement of investment disputes, has similarly - as is widely 
known- registered a record number of cases over the past 
decade. The recent statistics of the caseload of ICSID show a 
massive increase in the number of investor-State arbitrations 
starting in the late 1990’s with a record of 52 new registered 
cases in 2015.48 As for 30 June 2017, ICSID had registered a 
total number of 619 cases, of which 250 were registered in the 
past five years.
With the quantitative increase of the relevance of international 
dispute settlement and arbitration, comes an increase in 
public and academic attention to the field. Questions such 
as how the courts and tribunals function, what their role 
is in international law and society, who the arbitrators and 
judges that decided cases are, why a certain method of dispute 
settlement is more effective than another or preferred, or what 
the authority of international courts and tribunals is, become 
relevant only to the extent that such courts and tribunals 
become academically visible and meaningful as a subject of 
enquiry, which in turn rests in part on a quantitative increase 
of their output. 
The Institutionalisation of Dispute Settlement
Recent decades have seen a clear increase in the number 
of legal dispute settlement mechanisms, referred to as 
‘the proliferation of judicial institutions’ ; I prefer to use 
institutionalisation since the so-called proliferation of courts 
and tribunals, has to be seen hand in hand with the increase 
in the use of arbitration, the move towards an increased 
acceptance - in advance - of the jurisdiction of international 
courts and tribunals and of international arbitral tribunals, 
and the increased recognition and acceptance of international 
dispute settlement as part of international law. 
The proliferation of legal dispute settlement mechanisms has 
been termed in legal scholarship ‘the single most important 
development of the post-Cold War age’.49 The International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea heard its first case in 1997, the 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding 
was created by the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement, and a whole 
range of regional international courts and tribunals also 
started functioning over the past two decades.50 The use of 
arbitration has similarly risen substantially, as explained a 
couple of minutes ago. 
The increase in the practice and of dispute settlement 
institutions as such, should be coupled to an increased 
acceptance by States of the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals, 
and of arbitral tribunals. To become a member of the World 
Trade Organisation implies the acceptance of the compulsory 
competence of the dispute settlement system provided for in the 
Marrakech Agreement. Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention 
likewise are bound - with certain exceptions - to choose 
submission of disputes that arise under that convention to either 
the Law of the Sea Tribunal, the International Court of Justice, 
or to arbitration, the Law of the Sea Tribunal having moreover 
two instances of compulsory jurisdiction. In the area of investor-
State arbitration, it is finally noticeable that the vast majority 
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of the 3000 or so investment treaties provide direct access for 
foreign investors to international arbitration resulting in a quasi-
compulsory dispute settlement system. As a consequence, as 
Samantha Besson has put it ‘current international law can no 
longer be understood without its judicial dimension’51, to which 
I would add the arbitral dimension.
Here also, of course, one should wonder why this is the case, 
since from the perspective of the principle of sovereign 
equality and the need for an explicit consent to have dispute 
settled, not much has changed since the discussion during the 
two Hague Peace Conference. 
A first explanation is the self-interested or self-centred nature 
of States - States accept the competence of a court or tribunal 
in advance only to the extent that it serves their interest. This 
has always been the case and has not changed much, with the 
exception of certain areas of international law which have 
grown substantially in importance in the past decades. A first 
example is dispute settlement at the World Trade Organisation 
where the downsides of not settling disputes that would 
impact the free flow of goods - such as the drop in import 
and export or economic countermeasures- outweigh clinging 
to the principle of sovereign independence and the sporadic 
ad hoc acceptance of the jurisdiction of a court to settle that 
dispute. The same holds true in respect of investor-State 
arbitration where the main reason underlying the signature of 
an investment treaty with an arbitration clause giving foreign 
investors direct access to arbitration still is that such a treaty 
stimulates foreign investment and capital flows between the 
signatory States, although the balancing exercise in that field 
is increasingly under tension as we have seen recently with 
the negotiations of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union. 
A second reason relates to recent surge in State’s - at least 
some States- idealistic strive for and renewed believe in the 
idea of justice, which has weakened the traditional diplomatic 
aspects of dispute settlement and the realist perspective on 
international law with had very much influenced international 
politics during the Cold War era.52 States seem to be less 
reluctant to bring a claim against another State before the 
Court, and to seek a remedy for what they consider to be a 
violation of international law53, also in cases which are of 
more global concern than of concern for a specific State, as 
was evidenced by the Whaling in the Antarctic case brought 
by Australia against Japan.54 The end of the Cold War without 
doubt has contributed to this. 
A legal technical complement to this evolution is the 
relinquishment of the old debate on the distinction between 
political and legal disputes. This can be seen in the recent 
Marshall Islands cases before the International Court of 
Justice, which concerned the obligations of India, Pakistan 
and the United Kingdom in relation to the cessation of 
the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.55 Vice-
President Yusuf, in his dissenting opinion in the case against 
the United Kingdom, described the ‘justiciability’ of disputes 
- the technical translation of the distinction between legal and 
political disputes - as an ‘old and controversial concept’ and 
as a ‘legal relic’.56 While a dissenting opinion, it is important 
to point out that the ICJ has over the past decades not refused 
to hear any case because the subject-matter would be ‘non-
justiciable’. 
But, of course, State interests continue to play a role in this 
debate. The limited number of acceptances of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice can also be 
explained by the fact that States are unwilling to relinquish 
control over certain of their interests, especially those which 
were previously captured by the category of ‘non-justiciable 
disputes’, which is why permanent Members of the Security 
Council such as the United States, China, and the Russian 
Federation have not done so. The same reason explains the 
opposition of States to the jurisdiction of the Court or of 
arbitral tribunals which have been established based on the 
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consent expressed in treaties in advance of the dispute, as 
we saw recently with China’s refusal to participate in the 
arbitration in relation to the South China Sea brought by the 
Philippines although China is a party to the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea and had thus accepted the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal. To keep a certain liberty in deciding 
whether or not to accept the Court’s jurisdiction on an ad hoc 
basis is also why the number of States which have accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
has not grown substantially over the past decades.
Is International Dispute Settlement still a Practice? 
This brings me to my last point - is international dispute 
settlement still a practice. Of course, international dispute 
settlement still is a practice. But not in the same sense as it 
was perceived before. For sure, arbitrators and judges still are 
appointed because they are considered best suited to settle the 
dispute - and settling the dispute still is their main task. 
But the increase in the number of courts and tribunals, has 
nonetheless given rise to research into who these international 
judges are56, and how the community of international litigators 
operates58, not the least because the community formerly 
engaged in international dispute settlement is now much 
broader than 10 or 20 years ago.59
More generally, the increased academic attention given to 
international dispute settlement, has removed the field from 
the ambit, which was already fading since a couple of decades, 
of the perception of dispute settlement as only a practice and 
not of any legal scientific relevance. My argument here has a 
form of circularity, I admit. It is inevitable that the perception 
of dispute settlement as a legal discipline rather than only 
a practice goes hand in hand with the increase of interested 
scholarship. That scholarship however has moved beyond 
analysing specific courts or the outcome of decisions to tackle 
more overarching theoretical and conceptual debates on 
international dispute settlement, including socio-legal studies, 
critical studies, and empirical studies to name but a few.60 
International dispute settlement is considered now as much 
more than a mere practical application of the law. The distance 
between the research in international dispute settlement from 
the practical realities of the field61 clearly show, the dissociation 
between theory and practice, which in this particular field is 
incremental towards achieving the status of legal discipline, 
if one would want to define this as status. It is worth pointing 
out in this respect that one of the ways in which this can be 
viewed is that one no longer has to be a practitioner in order 
to be an academic researching and teaching on international 
dispute settlement, although that idea still is very much extant 
in the field of international arbitration. International dispute 
settlement has moved from ‘doing law’ to ‘thinking about law’.62
I would like to conclude my inaugural lecture by thanking 
everyone who has contributed to my appointment to this chair. 
I find it a great honour. Thank you in particular to the Rector 
Magnificus. My gratitude also goes to all past and present 
members of the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, 
who, since we are a large centre, are too many to mention. 
I would also like to thank the present and previous Faculty 
Board, for their confidence in me and specifically I thank our 
current Dean, Joanne van der Leun, and the current Academic 
Director of the Institute of Public Law, Willemien den Ouden. 
Finally, a special thanks to my family, and in particular my 
partner Katia Gevaert for, amongst many other things, her 
patience, support, and encouragement. 
Ik heb gezegd. 
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